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The ignorance, misinformation, and fear that accompanied public
awareness of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the mid-
1980s has had lingering effects upon American immigration policy. The
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) first proposed adding AIDS
to the list of "dangerous contagious diseases"' that are grounds for excluding
an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in April 1986.2 In
1987, Congress and the President prompted the Secretary to finalize regulations
that would make Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection a public
health exclusion. 3 Members of Congress were concerned that other countries
would encourage and "support emigration of their [HIV] infected citizens" to
the United States.4 The Secretary agreed that "[w]ith our current state of
1. The exclusion laws were amended in 1990 to change *dangerous contagious discascs- to
"communicable disease[s] of public health significance." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)(AX0)1994) A list of those
diseases is provided at 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b) (1987).
2. See Medical Examination of Aliens (AIDS), 51 Fed. Reg. 15.354 (1986) (to be codified at 42 C FR
§ 34.2(b)(8)) (proposed Apr. 23, 1986).
3. See 133 CONG. REc. 57410 (daily ed. June 2. 1987): Medical Examination of Aliens. 52 Fed Reg
32,540 (1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 34). Congress amended the Supplemental Appropnations Act
by a vote of 96 to 0 to direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to list HIV as an ccludablc
disease. See 133 CONG. REC. S7415 (daily ed. June 2, 1987) (Rollcall Vote No. 142) These regulations
were finalized in June 1987. See Medical Examination of Aliens (AIDS). 52 Fed Reg 21.532 (1987) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 34).
4. Medical Examination of Aliens (AIDS). 52 Fed. Reg. at 32.543. Ignorance about the genesis and
transmission of HIV led the Centers for Disease Control to list Haitians as a high nsk group along vith
homosexuals, intravenous drug users, and hemophiliacs. See Elizabeth Mar), McCormick. Note. HIV.
Infected Haitian Refugees: An Argument Against Exclusion. 7 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ 149. 153-54 (1993)
Haitian national origin was removed as a risk factor in 1985. as knowledge increa.ed about transmission
of HIV. See id. at 156-57. There was uncertainty about the costs and health implications of HIV in 1987
One commentator has noted that,
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knowledge about HIV infection .... the exclusion of applicants with HIV
infection is justified."5
In 1993, in the face of increasing knowledge about the transmission of
HIV, President Bill Clinton announced his intention to order HHS to remove
HIV infection from the list of excludable diseases. 6 Congress responded by
codifying the HIV exclusion to override the President's decision.7 As a result,
the exclusion of HIV-positive aliens applying for immigrant visas, refugee
visas, and adjustment to permanent resident status is still in effect. The HIV
exclusion, however, is not an absolute bar to admission for all aliens. Refugees
may obtain waivers under the Refugee Act of 1980,8 which granted the
Attorney General discretion to waive some exclusions, including the HIV
exclusion, "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is
otherwise in the public interest." 9 Since 1988, the INS has refused to grant
[n]early all exclusions have been enacted at times of a high degree of nativism, racism, or anti-
communism. Furthermore, the enactments often coincide with economic depressions and serve
the domestic political needs of elected officials. The exclusions say more about the fears of the
native-born than they do about the immigrant groups targeted.
Robert J. Foss, The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: New Possibilities for Gay and Lesbian
Inmigration, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 445 (1994). Given that HIV was first associated with
Haitian national origin in 1982, that there were fears about the U.S. economy in 1988, and that 1988 was
an election year, it is not difficult to see why the general exclusion of HlV-positive immigrants was passed.
5. Medical Examination of Aliens (AIDS), 52 Fed. Reg. at 32, 543. The concern that other nations
would export undesirable aliens to the United States was one of the primary reasons immigration exclusions
were originally passed. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS
UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 89-263, at 6 (1988) [hereinafter
EXCLUSION HISTORY].
6. See Philip J. Hilts, Clinton to Lift Ban on H.L -Infected Visitors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9. 1993, at A 17.
7. The exclusion was signed into law as part of the National Institute of Health Revitalization Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122, 210 (1993). From 1987 to the present, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) has enforced the HIV exclusion primarily by requiring a serologic HIV test
for aliens applying for immigrant visas, refugee visas, and adjustment to permanent resident status. See
Medical Examination of Aliens (AIDS), 52 Fed. Reg. 21,607-08 (1987). Although the primary way the INS
discovers that an alien is HIV-positive is through a required medical examination, it may exclude any alien
whose HIV status becomes known to an immigration officer. See Memorandum from Office of the
Commissioner, INS, to All Regional Commissioners, All District Directors, and All Officers in Charge
(Sept. 18, 1990), reprinted in 67 Interpreter Releases 1089, 1100-01 (Fed. Publications) (1990); see also
SANA LOUE, IMMIGRATION LAW & HEALTH: PATIENTS AND PROVIDERS 9-17 (1995).
8. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Star. 102, 104 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The
Refugee Act explicitly covers refugees, who are, by definition, aliens applying for a refugee visa from
abroad with a United States Consulate or regional director. See 8 CF.R. § 207 (1995). The Refugee Act
also grants the Attorney General discretion to admit asylees, who are aliens located in the United States
when they apply for protection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994); 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1995). Both refugees and
asylees must meet the definition of a refugee. A refugee is a person who "is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994). The main difference between
refugees and asylees is that refugees are overseas and asylees are in the United States when they apply for
protection. In addition, the Refugee Act delegates authority over asylees to the Attorney General, so the
standards governing admission of asylees, while parallel to the refugee provisions, are within the discretion
of the Attorney General. Refugees and asylees who apply for adjustment to permanent resident status are
also eligible for a waiver of the HIV exclusion. See id. § 1159(c). This Note only discusses the application
of the INS HIV Rule to refugee applicants and applicants for permanent resident status. The term refugees
encompasses both groups unless otherwise indicated.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (1994).
Excluding HIV-Positive Refugees
HIV waivers to refugees unless they can prove that the federal government
will not have to pay for their medical treatment. In 1988, Associate
Commissioner James A. Puleo released a memorandum in which he set forth
three criteria that limit the availability of HIV waivers."' The third criterion
of the memo requires immigration officers to evaluate whether the government
will bear the medical costs of admitting a refugee, which this Note will refer
to as the INS HIV Rule.
The INS initially applied the INS HIV Rule to illegal aliens applying for
permanent resident status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act
Amendment to the INA (IRCA)" in 1986 through a formal regulation., "
This regulation only concerns aliens applying for permanent residence under
the amnesty provisions of IRCA, 3 but through the Puleo Memo the INS
informally extended the HIV Rule to refugee applicants as well as refugees and
asylees applying for permanent resident status.'" Puleo's successor, Alexander
Aleinikoff, issued a memo reaffirming the Puleo Memo in 1995.'5
The INS HIV Rule contradicts the Refugee Act waiver provision, which
states that the Attorney General cannot apply public charge exclusions to
refugees. 16 While the Immigration and Nationality Act does not define the
term "public charge," over one hundred years of case law and legislative
history indicate that a public charge is a person who is likely to become
dependent on government support for survival. 7 In the 1995 Aleinikoff
Memo, the INS recognized that refugees cannot be excluded as public charges
10. See Cable from James A. Puleo. INS Assistant Commissioner for Examinations. to INS Field
Offices (Mar. 2, 1988), reprinted in 65 Interpreter Releases 239 (Fed. Publications) (198 8 ) [hereinafter
Puleo Memo].
I1. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2) (1994).
12. 8 C.F.R. § 245a(3)(d)(4) (1995).
13. See id. See generally Bettina M. Fernandez. Comment. HIV Exclusion of Iimigrants Under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 5 LA RAZA L. 65 (1992) (arguing that HIV exclusion
waiver criteria undermine purpose of IRCA amnesty legislation); Court E. Golumbic. Comment. Closing
the Open Door: The Impact of the Human lmmunodefictency Virus Excluston on the Legalization Program
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. 15 YALE J. INr'L L 162. 177-79 (1990) (dicussing
application of HIV exclusion to IRCA amnesty applicants).
14. See Puleo Memo, supra note 10, at 239; UNTrED NATIONS HIGH COMMs1. ON REFLGEES. A GLIDE
TO THE U.S. INS HIV WAIVER APPLIcATION PROCESS FOR THE RESETTLEM.%,ET or REFLGEEs I (1995)
[hereinafter UNHCR Memo]. The INS has enforced the HIV Rule against refugees uithout the bcncfit of
a formal regulation promulgated in accordance with the notice and comment requirements under the
Administrative Procedure Act. See Angela NI. Bean & Robert S. Hilliard. Representing Client. i ith HIV.
in 2 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW ASSOCIATION IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITr' L.%% HANDBOOK 492.
495 (4th ed. 1993).
15. See Memorandum from Alexander T. Alemikoff, Executive Associate Commissioner of the INS.
Regarding Immigrant Waivers For Aliens Found Excludable Under Section 212(alllU(A)(u) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act Due to HIV Infection (Sept. 6. 1995). reprinted in 72 Interpreter Releases
1347 (Fed. Publications) (1995) [hereinafter Aleimkoff Memo]
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1994) (stating that "lany alien sho. in the opinion of the consular
officer at the time of application for a visa. or in the opinion of the Attome) General at the time of
application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is
excludable"). However, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (1994) specifically exempts refugees from this pro%tsion
See also infra note 20.
17. See infra Sections I.B-C.
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even if they become dependent on the government for support.' 8 However,
the Aleinikoff Memo also reiterates the INS HIV Rule, requiring an alien to
show that "there will be no cost incurred by any level of government agency
of the United States without the prior consent of that agency."' 9 While the
INS claims that the HIV Rule is not the public charge exclusion listed under
INA section 212(a)(4), 20 it is used to effect the same result. Under no other
exclusion provision does the INS require a waiver applicant to prove that she
will not become a public charge as a condition for waiver eligibility. In every
other instance, the public charge exclusion is considered a separate ground for
exclusion.
This Note argues that the INS HIV Rule violates the Refugee Act of 1980
and is therefore an illegitimate use of administrative discretion. Part I examines
whether the INS HIV Rule is a public charge exclusion or a public health
exclusion and concludes that it is a public charge exclusion. 21 Part II argues
that applying a public charge exclusion to refugees is contrary to the plain
language and legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980. It further
demonstrates that the 1993 codification of the HIV exclusion did not grant the
INS discretion to consider costs for HIV-positive refugees. Finally, Part III
discusses the limited avenues of judicial review available to refugees and
concludes with a discussion of policy reasons why the INS should abandon the
HIV Rule.
I. PUBLIC CHARGE OR PUBLIC HEALTH?
The INS is clearly aware that the public charge exclusion does not apply
to refugees. In a 1995 memorandum to all INS District Directors and Field
Staff, Associate Commissioner Aleinikoff stated that "the public charge
provisions do not apply to refugees," and that "[r]efugees and individuals
granted asylum who are applying for adjustment of status under section 209
of the Act are not subject to the public charge ground of excludability."22
However, Aleinikoff also reaffirmed the INS HIV Rule, which requires
refugees to prove they will not burden any government agency.23 While
18. See Aleinikoff Memo, supra note 15, at 1353.
19. Id.
20. The refugee exclusion waiver provision states that "[tihe provisions of paragraphs (4), (5), and
(7)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title shall not be applicable to any alien seeking admission to the United
States under this subsection." 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3). Section 1182(a)(4) provides for the exclusion of
persons seeking admission to the United States on the ground that they are "likely at any time to become
a public charge." Id. § 1182(a)(4). Section II82(a)(5) is the labor certification requirement. See id. §
1182(a)(5). Section 1182(a)(7)(A) requires all immigrant applicants to provide documentation that will
establish their identity, including a valid passport. See id. § II 82(a)(7)(A).
21. See Deborah J. Bartz, Comment, The United States HIV Exchsion: Endangering Refugees' Human
Rights, 17 HAMLINE L. REv. 155, 174 (1993).
22. Aleinikoff Memo, supra note 15. at 1353.
23. See id. at 1351.
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Congress initially conflated public health and public charge concerns in
immigration exclusion law in the early 1900s, since 1952 Congress has treated
medical costs as a public charge issue, not as a matter of public health. Judicial
precedent confirms that ability to pay medical costs can only be understood as
a public charge concern. The INS has not justified the apparent inconsistency
between the mandatory waiver of the public charge exclusion under the
Refugee Act and the HIV Rule.24
A. The INS HIV Rule: Requiring Evidence of Self-Sufficiency
The INS has indicated in the Puleo and Aleinikoff memoranda that:
[T]he discretionary authority of the Attorney General will not be used
unless the applicant can establish that (I) the danger to the public
health of the United States created by the alien's admission to the
U.S. is minimal, (2) the possibility of the spread of the infection
created by the alien's admission to the U.S. is minimal, and (3) there
will be no cost incurred by any level of ,overnment agency of the
U.S. without prior consent of that agency.2
According to the INS, the third criterion, the INS HIV Rule, can be met in at
least four ways.26 First, an applicant may provide evidence that she has
private health care insurance that will cover her health care costs.27 Second,
an applicant may provide evidence of financial resources that would cover the
medical costs of HIV treatment.2 Third, an applicant may provide a
statement of consent to treatment from government health care officials.29
Last, an applicant may provide a statement from a specific private or
government health care or research facility that will assume responsibility for
treatment. 30 The INS has noted that "the average cost of medical treatment
for an HIV-infected person ... is approximately U.S. $85,500."" Given the
conditions that create refugees,32 and the fact that the estimated lifetime cost
to the government for treating HIV in the United States ranges from $40,000
24. David Martin, General Counsel for the INS. could not explain the inconsn'tenc) in . bnef
interview, nor could Kelly Ryan, Associate Gencral Counsel at the State Department See lntcric v,th
David Martin, General Counsel, INS, in New Haven. Conn (Apr 18. 1996) (notes on file wIth the Yale
Laiv Journal); Telephone Interview with Kelly Ryan. Associate General Counsel. Departnmcnt of State (Apr
26, 1995) (notes on file with the Yale Law Journal).
25. Puleo Memo, supra note 10. at 239.
26. See Aleinikoff Memo, supra note 15. at 1351. 1353
27. See id. at 1351; UNHCR Memo, supra note 14. at 2
28. See Aleinikoff Memo, supra note 15. at 1351; UNHCR Memo. supra note 14. at 2
29. See Aleinikoff Memo, supra note 15, at 1351; UNHCR Memo. supra note 14. at 2
30. See Aleinikoff Memo, supra note 15, at 1351: UNHCR Memo. supra note 14. at 2
31. Aleinikoff Memo, supra note 15, at 1349.
32. See generally U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES. WORLD REFLGEE SLRVEY (1995) tdocumenting
impoverished conditions under which most refugees survive after fleeing persecutors)
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to $75,000 per person,33 the typical refugee would probably have difficulty
qualifying for a waiver based on her personal resources. Unfortunately, the
INS has not compiled a comprehensive list of its waiver decisions. In addition,
a lack of explicit policies on what evidence is sufficient to prove that a refugee
will not become a public burden exacerbates uncertainty in the waiver process
and makes it difficult to evaluate how the HIV Rule is actually being applied
to refugees. 34
B. Lessons From the Past: The Separation of Public Charge and Public
Health Concerns
Congress and the INS excluded aliens as public charges and public health
threats for over one hundred years. The historical development of exclusion
policy by Congress and the INS, however, shows an increasingly clear
distinction between health and public charge concerns. This distinction
indicates that medical costs must be recognized as a public charge concern.
Congress enacted the first federal immigration exclusion on March 3,
1875. 35 The main purpose of the exclusion was to prevent the emigration of
people likely to become dependent on the public coffers for support.36
Congress passed the first formal public health exclusion in 1891, excluding
"persons suffering from a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease. 3 7 The
trend of excluding aliens for public charge and public health reasons continued
throughout the early 1900s. 38 Congress enacted public health exclusions to
protect the public health and the federal treasury; it was concerned about the
financial burden posed by aliens' medical conditions.
33. See Jesse Green & Peter S. Arno, The 'Medicaidazation' of AIDS, 264 JAMA 1261, 1261 (1990);
discussion infra Subsection III.B.2.
34. Indeed, at least one East Coast district had no policy regarding evidence sufficient to meet the
burden of proof other than health insurance. Given that the District Director had not adjudicated any
applications for an HIV waiver to date, he indicated that he did not think the issue warranted attention until
an application was actually under review. See John Weiss, Remarks at the Connecticut AILA Meeting
(Nov. 30, 1995) (notes on file with the Yale Law Journal).
35. See EXCLUSION HISTORY, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing 18 Stat. 477 (1875)); see also Richard
A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-Citizens' Access to Public Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary
Response, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1475, 1480 (1995); James F Smith, A Nation That Welcomes Immigrants?:
An Historical Examination of United States Immigration Policy, I U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227,
229-30 (1995).
36. See EXCLUSION HISTORY, supra note 5, at 6.
37. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084; see also EXCLUSION HISTORY, supra note 5, at 10.
38. The Act of February 20, 1907, added the exclusion of persons with physical and mental defects.
See Pub. L. No. 59-96, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 898-99 (1907); see also EXCLUSION HISTORY, supra note 5, at
14. The Act of February 5, 1917, added the term "vagrants" to the public charge exclusions. See Pub. L.
No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875; see also EXCLUSION HISTORY, supra note 5, at 21. Waivers were
available, however, for some immediate relatives. The Act of March 3, 1903, provided a waiver for those
persons suffering from "any contagious disorder" if they were immediate family members of immigrants
who had applied for citizenship and could prove the "disorder was contracted on board the ship in which
they came." Pub. L. No. 57-162, § 37, 32 Stat. 1213, 1221.
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The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 refined the public health
exclusions to separate the concern that a person with health problems would
become a public charge from the concern that a person posed a health risk to
the community. 39 The INA structurally separated these public health and
public charge concerns by creating separately numbered exclusions in the
legislation.40 Under the 1952 regulations and under present regulations, there
are two levels of health exclusion: those warranting the issuance of a Class A
Medical Certificate and those warranting a Class B Medical Certificate.'
Doctors issue a Class A Medical Certificate out of a public health concern
that an alien poses a threat to herself or the community. If an examining doctor
issues a Class A Medical Certificate, the alien is presumptively excludable as
a threat to public health and the immigration officer must exclude the alien
unless a discretionary waiver is available. 2 In contrast, the Class B Medical
Certification is not concerned with public health, but rather, is used to exclude
aliens on the basis that they might become public charges. ' 3 The Class B
Medical Certificate is not a per se exclusion and is only used as evidence that
the INS should exclude an alien as a public charge." A physician issues a
39. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82414. § 212.66 Stat, 163. 182 (1952)- Whle
the 1952 INA marks the first time public health and public charge concerns were clearly separated. in
reality it was the culmination of a trend toward separation and refinement of immigration cxclusion law
For instance, the Public Health Service kept active tuberculosis as a mandatory cxclusion. but provided that
tuberculosis which had been inactive for over one year was only a ground for exclusion if it affected an
alien's ability to earn a living. See H.R. REP. No. 82-1365. at 48 (1952). cited in Exc'.t'sioN HISTORY.
supra note 5, at 75. Similarly, the exclusion of people with disabilities that might affect thear ability to
support themselves became waivable if they could prove they would not have to cam a living See S REP
NO. 81-1515, at 345 (1950), cited in ExCLUSION HISTORY. supra note 5. at 75 In these two examples.
Congress and the INS separated public health exclusions from the public charge rationale for exclusion
This refinement was codified in the 1952 INA which included a separate exclusion applicable to any alien
certified by the examining surgeon as having a physical defect, disease, or disability. when
determined by the consular or immigration officer to be of such a nature that it may affect the
ability of the alien to earn a living, unless the alien affirmatively establishes that he will not
have to earn a living.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163. 182 (1952) This increasing
refinement in exclusion law can be attributed, in part, to the increasing bureaucratization of immigration
law as the INS gained more control over the immigration process. See generally SELECT CO.'t.'tN ON
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POL'Y, 96Tm CONG.. HISTORY OF TIlE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALZATION
SERVICE 61-66 (1980).
40. The public health exclusions were listed under INA §§ 212(a)(I)-(6). Pub L No 82-414.66 Stat
163, 182 (1952). The public charge exclusions were listed as INA §§ 212(a)(7)-(8) & 212(a)(15. 66 Stat.
163. The public charge exclusions included exclusions for physical or mental disability that affected the
ability to earn a living, exclusion of "paupers, professional beggars or vagrants." and exclusion of other
persons likely to become a public charge. See id.
41. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.4 (1995).
42. See id. § 34.4(b).
43. See id. § 34.4(c).
44. The Immigration Act Amendments of 1990 reflected a growing belief that a physical or mental
disability is not necessarily a threat to the community and does not necessarily make a person incapable
of supporting herself. See Peter Margulies. Asylum. Intersectianalt.; and AIDS. Women wah HIV as a
Persecuted Social Group, 8 GEo. IMMIGR. LJ. 521,539 (1994). Congress narrowed the mental and physical
disability exclusions to apply only to those mental or physical afflictions that present a threat to the lives
or property of others. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(I)(A)(ii)(l)-(ll) (1994).
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Class B Medical Certificate if she finds "other physical and mental
abnormalities that bear on the likelihood of an alien becoming a public
charge."45
Under current regulations, medical doctors must make findings regarding
the public charge provision separate from the public health exclusion decision.
Federal regulations require doctors to consider:
the nature and extent of the abnormality, the degree to which the alien
is incapable of normal physical activity, and the extent to which the
condition is remediable. The medical examiner shall indicate the
likelihood, that because of the condition, the applicant will require• • • 46
extensive medical care or institutionalization.
According to this description, medical costs are explicitly considered a public
charge issue.
Given that medical costs are treated as a public charge issue in the Federal
Regulations, it seems clear that the INS HIV Rule is a public charge exclusion
for HIV-positive refugees. By injecting public charge issues back into public
health exclusions, the INS has returned to the practice of the late 1800s and
early 1900s, when public charge and public health concerns were not separated
in exclusion decisions.
47
C. Judicial Opinion: Ability to Pay Is Not a Health Concern, But a Public
Charge Issue
One argument for excluding aliens who cannot afford health care is that
they pose a threat to public health if they are not treated. No court, however,
has held that ability to pay for medical expenses is a public health concern. In
fact, ability to pay has always been considered a public charge issue. Early
cases held that hospitalization at public expense due to conditions arising
before entry was a ground for exclusion as a public charge. 48 In Ex parte
Wong Nung v. Carr,49 an alien was excluded as a public charge because he
45. 42 C.F.R. § 34.4(c)(1) (1995).
46. Id. § 34.4(c)(2).
47. This conflation of public health and public charge concerns is premised on the notion that people
with disabilities are incapable of supporting themselves. Under the logic of the INS HIV Rule, every alien
with a medical disability would be presumptively excludable as a public charge. Such a view of disability
would probably conflict with the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994), but a full
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
48. See, e.g., Canciamilla v. Haff, 64 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1933) (excluding alien as public charge after
being committed to state hospital at public expense for epileptic condition); Fernandez v. Nagle, 58 F.2d
950, 950 (9th Cir. 1932) (excluding alien as public charge when committed to "Relief Home for the Aged
and Infirm" because alien was "too weak and sick" to work).
49. 30 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1924).
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was admitted to a public hospital for leprosy treatments.50 Mental defects also
have been grounds for exclusion as a public charge even without any proof of
past institutionalization at public expense. 5' One judge explained that -[a]
person likely to become a public charge is one whom it may be necessary to
support at public expense by reason of poverty, insanity and poverty, disease
and poverty, idiocy and poverty.
' 52
In Matter of B,53 the Board of Immigration Appeals held that an alien
admitted to an Illinois mental institution at public expense was not deportable
as a public charge because the state provided free mental care to all state
residents. The court considered hospitalization at public expense to be a public
charge issue, and not a public health issue." In Matter of Harutunian," the
Board used the same rationale when it modified the reasoning in Matter of B
and held that an alien who received old age assistance from the state of
California was excludable under the public charge provision. 6
This case law indicates that an alien's inability to pay medical costs is a
public charge matter. Despite the fact that two cases involved leprosy and
syphilis,57 both contagious diseases listed as communicable diseases of public
health significance in the Immigration and Nationality Act," the courts have
never excluded aliens unable to pay for their medical treatment as public health
threats. The courts have not distinguished between dangerous and benign
mental and physical conditions in reasoning that failure to pay medical
expenses is solely a public charge issue.
50. See id. at 768-69.
51. See United States ex rel. Minuto v. Retmer. 83 F2d 166. 168 (2d Cir 1936) ("She w'as a 'Aoman
seventy years old with an increasing chance of being dependent. disabled, and sick ") (affirming exclusion
order); United States ex rel. Markin v. Curran. 9 F.2d 900 (2d Cir 1925) (excluding alien as likely to
become public charge because she had syphilis and was blind in one eye); United States eT riel La Faia
v. Williams, 204 F 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (excluding alien as likely to become public charge due to 'ahular
heart condition).
52. Wallis v. United States ex rel. Mannara. 273 F. 509. 511 (2d Cir 192 1) (excluding aliens as likely
to become public charges due to cardiac problem and senility).
53. 3 I. & N. Dec. 323 (B.I.A. 1948).
54. See id. at 324. While asylees and refugees are presumably subject to the public charge ground for
deportation, this decision significantly decreases the possibility that an asylec or refugee uould be put in
deportation proceedings on the basis of his or her medical costs. Refugees and asylees arc eligible for many
forms of public benefits granted to all residents. See Stephen H. Legomsky. Immigration. Federalm. and
the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1453, 1458-60 (1995) One other bamer to deportation proceedings
is the lack of statutory authority under the Refugee Act to revoke asylum or refugee status on the basis of
a refugee's excludability. See infra Section III.A.
55. 14 I. & N. Dec. 583 (B.I.A. 1974).
56. See id. at 590.
57. See Exparie Wong Nung v. Carr, 30 F.2d 766 (9th Cir 1929); Markin v Curran. 9 F2d 900 (2d
Cir. 1925).
58. Any alien "who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescnbed by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services) to have a communicable disease of public health significance. shich shall
include infection with the etiologic agent for [AIDS)- ts excludable 8 U.S C § 1182ta)x IYA):) (1995)
The Secretary of Health and Human Services has listed chancroid. gonorrhea. granuloma inguinalc. HIV.
infectious leprosy, lymphogranuloma venerum. syphilis in the infectious stage, and actise tuberculosis as
diseases of public health significance. See 42 C.F.R. § 34 2(b) (1995)
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D. Public Health and Untreated Diseases: Why the HIV Exclusion Does Not
Promote Public Health
The exclusion of aliens because of their inability to pay for treatment of
their medical problems has long been considered a public charge issue by the
courts, Congress, and the INS. Deviating from the historical treatment of
medical care costs by treating the INS HIV Rule as a public health exclusion
admittedly could be justified by an unprecedented medical problem that
presented an uncontrollable public health risk unless the disease was treated.
When HIV was first discovered, scientists were unsure how it was transmitted
and whether treatment for the medical condition would decrease the risk of
transmission. 59 Under these conditions, barring the entry of aliens who were
unable to guarantee they would be treated seems justifiable as a public health
exclusion. 6° But under the current state of medical knowledge, the INS HIV
Rule cannot be justified as a rule designed to protect the public health.
The only public health rationale that could be supported by the INS HIV
Rule is that the mere existence of an untreated HIV-positive refugee in the
community would pose a threat to the public health. This reasoning, however,
has no basis in epidemiological knowledge. At the present time, there is no
known cure for HIV, and there is no medical treatment that can decrease the
probability of transmitting the virus. Unlike tuberculosis, treatment does not
make HIV less contagious. HIV cannot be transmitted by casual contact; it can
only be transmitted through specific behaviors. 6' HIV, therefore, does not
present the same public health risk that would be created by allowing people
with contagious diseases spread by casual contact or airborne vectors to remain
untreated.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION: LOOKING FOR JUSTIFICATION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE REFUGEE ACT
While administrative agency interpretations of statutes are given great
deference after Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.62 and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,63 legislative
regulations must be overruled when they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
59. See supra note 4.
60. See generally McCormick, supra note 4, at 153-57 (discussing early medical knowledge of HIV).
61. See Christine N. Cimini, Note, The United States Policy on HJV Infected Aliens: Is Exclusion an
Effective Solution?, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 367, 377-80 (1992) (discussing several studies of HIV
transmission). The INS can exclude refugees who pose a threat because of their behavior without recourse
to consideration of health care costs. See Aleinikoff Memo, supra note 15, at 1351. The first two prongs
of the Aleinikoff Memo require refugees to prove that "(I) the danger to the public health of the United
States created by [the alien's] admission is minimal, [and] (2) the possibility of the spread of the infection
created by [the alien's] admission to the U.S. is minimal." Id.
62. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
63. 401 U.S. 402 (1970).
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contrary to statute.6' Under Chevron, courts review administrative agency
actions in two steps. First, the courts determine whether an agency rule or
regulation contradicts a congressional mandate as evidenced by express
congressional intent. 6' The Supreme Court has held that the plain language
of the statute is the first place to look for congressional intent.6 If the
wording of the legislation does not resolve the question, the courts proceed to
examine the legislative history of the statute governing the administrative rule
for evidence that the administrative rule is consistent with the intent and
purpose of the statute.67 If the legislative history does not address the issue,
or the legislative history addresses the issue and clearly expresses an intention
consistent with the administrative regulation, then the courts must defer to the
administrative agency's interpretation of the statute and uphold the rule or
regulation as a valid exercise of administrative authority." Second, when an
administrative agency rule is facially valid under the first step of the Chevron
test, the court only determines whether the rule is being applied in an arbitrary
or capricious manner.69 Finally, if the court finds that the application of the
regulation is "based on a permissible construction of the statute," the agency
decision is not an abuse of discretion.70
This Part applies the first step of the Chevron test to the INS HIV Rule
and concludes that the INS HIV Rule violates the plain language, legislative
intent, and general purpose of the 1980 Refugee Act and is therefore contrary
to the statute.7' First, the INS HIV Rule ignores the unique language of the
64. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Overton Park. 401 U.S at 416
65. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
66. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993); see also west Virginia Unsn tosp. Inc
Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (explaining that when statutory language is clear. courts should not look to
statements from legislators or congressional committees)- Barr v. United States. 324 U S 83. 90 (1945) (If
Congress has made a choice of language which fairly bnngs a situation within a statute, it is unimportant
that the particular application may not have been contemplated by the legislators "
67. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863.
68. See id. at 843, 866.
69. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; see also Chevron. 467 U S at 843
70. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
71. This Note does not focus on whether the INS HIV Rule would also fail the second step of the
Chevron-Overton Park test as an arbitrary or capricious use of administrative agenc) authont, In the
second step of review, the courts determine whether the application of a regulation "-was based on a
consideration of relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment " 0% erron Park. 401
U.S. at 416. Part III discusses the availability of judicial review and some polic) reasons explaining wshy
the application of the HIV Rule to refugees is contrary to humanitarian goals, but a more in-depth analysis
of the second step of judicial review is beyond the scope of this Note. The INS HIV Rule may indeed be
arbitrary if it is not applied to all refugee applicants equally or if it contradicts the general humanttanan
purposes of the Refugee Act. While an exploration of this issue may be fruitful, it is difficult to evaluate
the impact of the INS HIV Rule because the INS does not systematically compile statistics on waier grants
and denials for refugees. In fact, only three HIV waiver grants have been widely publicized See Joseph
Migliozzi, Note, The INA Asylum Application Procedure for Political Refugees WItth HIV. 3 REGE%,T U
L. REv. 95, 117 (1993). Kelly Ryan. Associate General Counsel for the State Department. said that in her
experiences at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, HIV-positive waiver applicants were able to meet the burden of
proof by showing that they had private health insurance. Telephone Interview with Kelly Ryan, Associate
General Counsel, Department of State (Apr. 26, 1995) (notes on file with the Kale Lau Journal)
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Refugee Act by applying the INS HIV Rule to HIV-positive refugees. The INS
HIV Rule also eviscerates two clearly stated purposes of the Refugee Act: (1)
to distinguish refugees from immigrants; and (2) to apply the same criteria to
all refugees in the admission process. Finally, the INS HIV Rule contradicts
Congress's express intention not to exclude refugees who cannot pay for their
medical care, but rather, to provide funding for their medical treatment.
A. The Language of the Refugee Act Exclusion Waiver Provision
The INS HIV Rule contradicts the plain language of the Refugee Act by
deliberately applying the public charge exclusion to HIV-positive refugees. The
Refugee Act, which was signed into law by President Carter on March 17,
1980,72 provided special guidance on the application of general immigration
exclusions to refugees. That guidance was articulated in the refugee exclusion
waiver, which indicates that the public charge exclusion, labor certification
requirements, and immigrant documentation requirements "shall not be
applicable to any alien seeking admission to the United States" under the
Refugee Act.73 The waiver also establishes that refugee applicants who are
excludable under the public health exclusions, as well as many of the other
immigration exclusions, may have those exclusions waived by the Attorney
General "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is
otherwise in the public interest." 74
The public charge exclusion must be waived for HIV-positive refugee
applicants because they are a subset of the group of "any aliens seeking
admission" under the Refugee Act. By its plain language, therefore, the
Refugee Act bars consideration of government costs of admitting and
supporting refugees, including the medical costs of refugees who are HIV-
positive. The Aleinikoff Memo directly contradicts the plain language of the
statute when it states that "the guidelines provided in this Memorandum are
intended to ensure that all waiver applications involving HIV infection are
adjudicated fairly and consistently, and that all aliens found excludable under
section 212(a)(1)(A)(i) [the HIV exclusion] are treated equally."75 This
memorandum fails to recognize that refugees are distinct from other
immigrants because they are aliens admitted under the Refugee Act.
72. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., REVIEW OF U.S.
REFUGEE RESETrLEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 51 (1980) [hereinafter RESETTLEMENT REPORT].
73. 8 U.S.C. § I157(c)(3) (1994); see also supra text accompanying note 20.
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3). Some exclusions are mandatory. Aliens who are ineligible to apply for
refugee status due to a mandatory exclusion include: controlled substance traffickers; aliens who present
a security concern; aliens who have engaged in terrorist activity; aliens whose admission affects foreign
policy concerns; and aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or any form of genocide. Id. § 1157(c)(3)
& § 1182(a)(2)(C), (a)(3)(A)-(C) & (E).
75. Aleinikoff Memo, supra note 15, at 1354.
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Not all immigrants are eligible for a waiver of the HIV exclusion, and not
all groups of immigrants are exempt from the public charge exclusion.76
There are five separate waivers of the HIV exclusion available under the
Immigration Act of 1990. These waivers cover different groups of immigrants
and give the Attorney General different levels of discretion to waive
immigration exclusions. Each waiver was passed with different considerations
in mind. A comparison of the other four exclusion waiver provisions with the
refugee waiver language clarifies how the INS HIV Rule, as a public charge
exclusion, is contrary to the plain language of the Refugee Act.
The fact that each waiver provision gives the Attorney General a different
level of discretion indicates that Congress contemplated the precise language
of the waiver provisions and intentionally waived the public charge exclusion
for refugees. Under the first waiver provision, immediate relatives of U.S.
citizens, permanent residents, and people with a valid U.S. immigrant visa may
be granted an HIV waiver at the complete discretion of the Attorney General.
A waiver of health exclusions is available under Section 212(g) of the INA.n
Section 212(g) of the INA states that the Attorney General may grant a waiver
"in accordance with such terms, conditions, and controls, if any, including the
giving of bond, as the Attorney General, in his discretion after consultation
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, may by regulations
prescribe. 78 Clearly, the Attorney General's discretion is unlimited under this
provision.79
The second example is the waiver provision in the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),80 a statute that granted illegal aliens who
had been in the United States before January 1, 1982 the chance to apply for
permanent resident status under a general amnesty if applications were filed
between November 6, 1986 and November 6, 1987. The Attorney General has
limited authority to waive the HIV exclusion for some IRCA applicants.8 '
The Attorney General cannot waive the public charge exclusion unless an
applicant is "an alien who is or was an aged, blind, or disabled individual."1
2
The Attorney General may waive some immigration exclusions, including the
HIV exclusion "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it
is otherwise in the public interest,"8 3 but the public charge exclusion cannot
76. The structure of the INA makes the public charge exclusion applicable to all immigrants unlc3s
a specific waiver of the exclusion is available. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
77. See id. § 1182(g). Under this provision. immediate relatives include minor unmarred children,
spouses, and parents.
78. Id.
79. See Faith G. Pendleton, Note, The United States Exclusion of HIV.Positliv Aliens Realities and
Illusions, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 269. 277 (1995)
80. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-603. § 201 (at I )(A). 100 Stat 3359.
3394.
81. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a.
82. Id. § 1255a(d)(2)(B).
83. Id. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(i). Application of the INS HIV Rule as a limtaion on the use of Attorney
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be waived unless someone is aged, blind, or disabled.
A waiver of some immigration exclusions was also available for Special
Agricultural Workers until October 25, 1994 under the Special Agricultural
Workers program (SAW)." Under this program, some migrant workers were
eligible to become permanent residents if they were not excludable under the
immigration exclusions. The statute gave the Attorney General the discretion
to waive all exclusions "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or
when it is otherwise in the public interest." 5 The public charge exclusion was
applied to Special Agricultural Workers, with a slight modification: "An alien
is not ineligible for adjustment of status ... if the alien demonstrates a history
of employment in the United States evidencing self-support without reliance
on public cash assistance., 86 As with the other waiver provisions, this waiver
makes the decision to waive the public heath exclusion discretionary, and like
the immediate relative waiver, the decision to waive the public charge
exclusion is wholly within the discretion of the Attorney General.
Finally, under the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) provision,87 the
Attorney General has complete discretion to waive the public charge exclusion
and many other immigration exclusions including the HIV exclusion.
Applicants for TPS must prove that they are nationals of, or last resided in, a
state designated by the Attorney General as eligible for Temporary Protected
Status due to armed conflict, environmental disaster, or the inability of the
state to handle the repatriation of nationals abroad or to assure the safe return
of its nationals. 8  The TPS waiver reiterates the typical waiver language in
providing that "the Attorney General may waive any other provision of section
1182(a) of this title in the case of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes,
to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest." 89
Because the waiver of the public charge consideration is permissive and not
mandatory, the INS HIV Rule would not violate the express language or
structure of this statute either.
The language of the waiver in the Refugee Act differs from the language
of the other four waiver provisions of the INA. It does not give the Attorney
General the discretion to apply the public charge exclusion. The other four
waiver provisions either give the Attorney General no discretion to waive the
General discretion to grant HIV waivers does not contradict the IRCA waiver provision because the statute
already indicates that waiver applicants will have to prove that they will not become a public charge. In
the limited case of aged, blind, or disabled applicants, the decision to waive the public charge exclusion
is left to the discretion of the Attomey General, so if the Attorney General decides to limit her own
discretion, it does not contradict any congressional mandates. But cf. Golumbic, supra note 13 (arguing that
application of HIV waiver program under IRCA violates spirit and intent of legislation).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1161 (1988) (repealed 1994).
85. Id. § 1161(e)(2)(A) (repealed 1994).
86. Id. § 1161(e)(2)(C) (repealed 1994).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
88. See id. § 1254a(b).
89. Id. § 1254a(c)(2)(A)(ii).
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public charge exclusion by making the public charge exclusion mandatory, or
complete discretion to waive the public charge exclusion as she sees fit. In
contrast, the Refugee Act gives the Attorney General no discretion to apply the
public charge provision in any circumstance. When the INS considers a
refugee's ability to pay for her medical expenses, it contravenes the plain
language of the refugee waiver provision by applying a public charge concern.
The contrast with the language used for other groups of immigrants
bolsters the conclusion that the language of the Refugee Act, which makes the
public charge exclusion inapplicable to any and all refugee applicants, was
intentional and clear. "Any alien[s] seeking admission" as refugees, whether
they are HIV-positive, permanently disabled, or young and healthy, are exempt
from the public charge exclusion. 90
B. Refugees, Asylees, and Other Immigrants: Looking at Legislative Intent
The legislative history of the Refuge Act further demonstrates that the INS
HIV Rule is contrary to congressional intent. Whether the INS applies the
public charge consideration indirectly during the exclusion waiver process or
directly through the application of the official public charge exclusion,
considering costs for individual refugees violates two purposes of the Refugee
Act: ensuring that refugees are treated differently from other immigrant
applicants; and removing ad hoc distinctions among refugees. The INS HIV
Rule eviscerates both purposes by grouping excludable refugees with all other
excludable immigrants.
1. Refugees Are Not Immigrants
While the legislative history of the Refugee Act does not specifically
discuss the rationale for the waiver provision, the very creation of a new status
not subject to the same requirements for admission as other immigrants clearly
indicates that Congress intended to distinguish refugees from other immigrants.
Moreover, in the legislative history of the Refugee Act, Congress indicated
explicitly that refugees should be treated differently from immigrants. The
legislative history expressly states that one objective of the Refugee Act is to
"separate[] the admission of refugees from that of immigrants under the
preference system."9' As one congressional report stated: "Refugees, as
distinct from immigrants, are aliens who flee their country of nationality
generally because of persecution or fear of persecution. Immigrants, in
contrast, leave their country of nationality voluntarily to seek family
reunification, economic, or other benefits through reestablishing permanent
90. Id. § 1157(c)(3).
91. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 1 (1979).
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residence in some other country of their choice. 'g Senator Edward Kennedy,
a sponsor of the Refugee Act, echoed this recognition of the different policy
reasons for admitting refugees than for admitting immigrants when he said, "It
also will give statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights
and humanitarian concerns, which are not now reflected in our immigration
laws. 93 This statement, along with many others in the legislative history,
shows that the standards for admission under the Refugee Act are separate
from the applicable standards for admission of immigrants.94
2. Congress Intended to Create a Standardized Admission Process for All
Refugees
The legislative history also indicates that Congress intended to admit
refugees on the basis of humanitarian concerns. To effectuate this goal,
Congress created a standardized admission procedure for refugee applicants.
The INS HIV Rule dismantles this standardization created by Congress
because it applies an exclusion to one subgroup of refugees that is not applied
to all refugees. The INS HIV Rule mandates proof that HIV-positive refugees
will not become public charges by failing to pay for their medical treatment.
This exclusion is not applied to refugees who are not HIV-positive.
One purpose of the 1980 Refugee Act was to end ad hoc and arbitrary
distinctions made between refugees for the purposes of admission. Before the
passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, there were many different programs for the
admission of refugees.95 Some refugee groups were subject to the public
charge exclusion while other groups of refugees were not: The admission
criterion varied depending on the law under which the refugee was admitted.
92. RESETTLEMENT REPORT, supra note 72, at 21. As one Representative argued:
inhere is a fundamental difference between being an immigrant and being a refugee. An
immigrant is a person who would like to come to the United States in search of the American
dream .... That is also true of the refugee, but a refugee comes not only in search of the
American dream but to escape a desperate personal nightmare. That person is coming not only
looking for personal opportunity but physical safety, refuge and sanctuary.
125 CONG. REc. 35,818 (1979) (statement of Rep. Mikulski).
93. 125 CONG. REc. 23,231-32 (1979).
94. See 126 CONG. REC. 4504 (1980) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ("[W]hen this bill was before
the House of Representatives on December 20, I opposed this bill on the grounds that it separated out our
policy on refugees from our policy on legal immigration .... The conference committee report does not
solve the problem ... and should be rejected for that reason."); 125 CONG. REC. 35,815-16 (1979)
(statement of Rep. Hamilton Fish) ("This bill represents a statement of a new U.S. policy toward refugees,
principally a focus on the humanitarian plight of the refugee."); see also infra Subsection II.B.2.
95. For a discussion of refugee law history, see generally GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN,
CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT (1986)
(detailing history of U.S. refugee policies); Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis:
A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981) (analyzing U.S. legal
responses to refugee and asylum policy after World War II, culminating in enactment of Refugee Act of
1980); Kathryn M. Bockley, Comment, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The Deception of
Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 253 (1995) (presenting historical
analysis of political factors in refugee admission process).
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The original Refugee Act bills, S. 643 and H.R. 2816, both included
mandatory waivers of the public charge exclusion for all refugee applicants. 6
This waiver was modeled after the Indochinese Refugee Act of 1977,' 7 in
which the INS granted Indochinese refugees adjustment to permanent residence
without regard to the public charge exclusion, the immigrant documentation
requirements, or the literacy requirement." Congress had passed several
pieces of legislation benefitting refugees before the passage of the Indochinese
Refugee Act.99 Under every previous piece of legislation, with one exception,
the public health and public charge exclusions had been mandatory."w The
one exception, the parole provisions of the INA, gave the Attorney General
complete discretion to parole aliens without regard to exclusions, **in his
discretion[,] . . .temporarily [and] under such conditions as he may prescribe
for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest."...
The parole provision gave the Attorney General the authority to license aliens
to come into the country temporarily for emergency reasons. Parole is similar
to probation in that the Attorney General can revoke parole at any time for any
reason including no good reason at all. Under this provision, Hungarian,
Soviet, Cuban, and Indochinese refugees were all paroled regardless of whether
they were technically excludable due to disease or poverty. -
Congress departed from the past practice of using different criteria to
admit and adjust different groups of refugees when it enacted the Refugee Act.
As initially drafted, the Senate version of the Refugee bill, S. 643, limited
eligibility to refugees of "special concern" to the United States."' The Senate
intended to allow flexibility for future policymakers when it adopted the
"special concern" language. As the Judiciary Committee of the Senate stated:
96. See S. REP. No. 96-256, at 15 (1979); H.R. REt. No. 96-608. at 29 (1979)
97. Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-145, 91 Slat. 1223.
98. See RESETTLEMENT REPORT, supra note 72. at 17.
99. See generally Bockley, supra note 95 (detailing use of political criteria for admission of refugee-,
under pre-1980 refugee programs).
100. Under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, an applicant had to proide eidencc that she ,%ould
not displace an American worker and that she would not become a public charge See Pub L No 80-774.
§ 2(d), 62 Stat. 1009, 1010, as amended by Act of June 16. 1950. Pub L No 81-555. 64 Slat 219. and
Act of June 28, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-60. 65 Slat. 96. Similarly. under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953.
aliens had to prove they had housing and would not become public charges. Again. the) ssere inadmissible
if they had contagious diseases. See Pub. L. No. 83-203. § (a)(14), 67 Stat 400. 403. as amended bs Act
of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Slat. 1044. The Fair Share Refugee Act also mandated that a
refugee-escapee prove she could, "with some assistance, become self supporing." and thai she meet the
public health exclusion. Act of July 14, 1960, Pub L. No. 86-648. § (b). 74 Slat 504. 504-"5 Finall,.
under the INA seventh preference for refugees, an alien had to be admissible as an immigrant. except that
the literacy requirements were not applicable. See Immigration and Nationality Act. Pub L No 82-414,
§ 212(b), 66 Stat. 163, 187 (1952); see also RESEtLE.iESNT REPORT. supra note 72. at 5-6 0isting all
refugee programs and admissions under those programs).
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1994). It is clear, however, that Congress did not foresee the use of the
parole provision to admit large groups of refugees. See Anker & Posner. supra note 95. at 15
102. See Bockley, supra note 95, at 266-78.
103. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 3 (1979).
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The bill does not, and cannot, explicitly define what refugees are
deemed to be "of special concern to the United States." . . . The bill,
when enacted, is designed for the decades to come, and what refugees
will be deemed of special concern to the American people will be a
public policy issue that will be, as it is now, debated and reviewed
continuously by Congress, the President, and the American
people. "°
The House of Representatives preferred to use the term "special humanitarian
concern" instead of the term "special concern."'0 5 The House made it clear
that it wanted to eliminate political considerations from the admission
criteria. 10 6 As Representative Hamilton Fish explained:
With respect to the allocation of numbers of refugees to be admitted
among different groups of refugees, the term "special humanitarian
concerns" defines those who will be admitted .... [T]he word
humanitarian was added to emphasize that the plight of the refugees
themselves is paramount as opposed to national origins, political
considerations or a possible contribution by the United States to the
refugee condition....
The committee report sets forth some of the historical
considerations that can provide guidance as to persons who are in fact
of humanitarian concern to this country.'
0 7
The House wording was eventually adopted so that all "refugees of special
humanitarian concern" are eligible to apply under the Refugee Act. 08
104. Id. at 6.
105. The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. 84 (1979) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of
Dale F. Swartz, D.C. Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law).
106. Dale F. Swartz of the D.C. Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law explained:
The House version, as I understand it, adopts the concept of special humanitarian concern, the
purpose being to, in effect, eliminate from our determinations of what groups of refugees we
will admit, purely political considerations; that it should be a humanitarian determination not,
as it has been in the past by statute, a somewhat humanitarian, somewhat political
determination.
Id.
107. 125 CONG. REC. 35,816 (1979) (statement of Rep. Fish) (emphasis added); see also id. at 23,237
(statement of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 23,246 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 35,813 (statement of Rep.
Holtzman) ("The committee report states explicitly that the criterion for admitting refugees ... will be
,special humanitarian concern."'). The Senate explicitly rejected an amendment offered by Senator
Huddleston that would have limited refugee admissions to those of "special responsibility to the United
States." Id. at 23,246 (Amendment No. 529).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994). Congress requires the President to admit only refugees of "special
humanitarian concern." Refugee Act § 101(b), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994)). The President conducts annual refugee prioritization based on
humanitarian factors in consultation with Congress. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3). Under the consultation
provision, President Clinton submitted a proposed revision to the worldwide refugee priority system in
1995. See Report to the Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year (FY) 1996, Aug. I,
1995, available in WESTLAW, U.S. Testimony Library, File No. 1995 WL 455226. If Congress or the
President intended to exclude HIV-positive refugees who could not pay for their medical costs, these
officials could have excluded HIV-positive refugees from the group of refugees of special humanitarian
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Congress standardized the admission criteria for refugees to combat
ideological and political restrictions and to create a procedure guided by
planning rather than ad hoc decisionmaking. As Senator Rudy Boschwitz
explained:
We need a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission of
refugees so as to insure [sic] all refugees that they will be treated
equally and fairly .... Our response to each crisis is subject to the
mood of the times rather than being guided by a set procedure that
must be applied to all the refugees seeking admission to the United
States."°
Echoing these comments, Representatives Shirley Chisholm, Peter Rodino, and
Elizabeth Holtzman lauded the fact that the Refugee Act applied the same
admission criteria for all refugees." 0
Even though Congress was primarily concerned with political
discrimination when it enacted the Refugee Act, Congress clearly did intend
to apply the same admission criteria to all refugees as a mechanism for
reducing both political and ideological discrimination. Exclusions are
admission criteria because they determine eligibility for admission. The INS
HIV Rule contradicts Congress's intent to eliminate the public charge
exclusion from the refugee admission process and to apply the same criteria,
including uniform exclusions, to all refugee applicants.
3. Congress Decided to Fund Medical Treatment Instead of E"Lcluding
Refugees
The legislative history of the Refugee Act also indicates that Congress
intended to pay for refugee medical expenses, not to exclude refugees with
concern indicated in the priority list. Not only did the President and Congress delinc to take thts measure.
but they also affirmatively indicated that refugees with severe medical problems s arranted a high admission
priority. Included among the group of refugees who receive first pnont) for admission are "'UNHCR-
referred or Embassy identified persons ... including somen-at-nsk. %ictims of torture or '.olen.e.
physically or mentally disabled persons in urgent need of medical treatment not asailable in the countr)
of first asylum," and "UNHCR-referred or Embassy identified persons, for %%hom other durable solutions
are not feasible and whose status in the place of asylum does not present a satisfactor, long-temi solution"
Id.
109. 125 CONG. REc. 23.240 (1979); see also RESETTLEE\'T REPORT. supra note 72. at I '-The
major impetus for the legislation was the need to end an ad hoc approach that had characterized LU S
Refugee policy since World War I.").
110. See 126 CONG. REc. 4501 (1980) (statement of Rep. Rodino} ("I firml) beliese that the product
of our labors has enabled us to present to the House landmark legislation in an area shich for )ears has
been dealt with on an ad hoc, piecemeal basis, many times reacting to a situation shen it %%a, upon us ").
125 CONG. REc. 35,820 (1979) (statement of Rep. Chisholm) ("Refugees fleeing persecution rcgardle-s of
the country they come from, on humanitarian considerations alone. should be equal in standing for entr)
into the United States."); id. at 35,813 (statement of Rep. Holtzman) ("This billl uill mandate equit, in
our treatment of all refugees ... it will provide set procedures for admission "'.
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medical problems. At least one commentator has argued that Congress never
intended to allow refugees into the country who would be dependent on the
state for medical treatment.' In reality, the legislative history of the
Refugee Act documents congressional awareness of the price for refugee
assistance quite vividly. In the face of significant evidence that the medical
costs for treating refugees would be long term and significant, Congress chose
a policy of assistance rather than exclusion.
When debating the Refugee Act, Congress was aware that many refugees
had medical problems that required treatment. As Representative Vento said,
The squalid conditions of the camps have contributed to severe health
problems among the refugees. In many cases their physical ailments
are chronic conditions requiring long-term treatment or the result of
tropical diseases, the diagnosis and treatment of which can be a major
problem for a physician in a cold weather State." 2
Not only was Congress aware that some refugees had long-term medical
disabilities, but Congress also knew that some refugees would need state-
supported medical care and benefits after admission." 3 Instead of excluding
aliens with medical problems because they could not support themselves,
Congress responded to the potential burden on state governments by funding
programs to address refugee needs. Representative Lungren stated in the floor
debates that "It]here is a Federal commitment, a correct Federal commitment,
in my judgment, that we should accept these refugees. However, at the same
time it ought to be a Federal commitment to take care of the refugees to the
extent that Government programs are necessary."' 4 The cost of medical
assistance was one of the most contentious issues in the floor debates.
Congress made it abundantly clear that the response to costs of resettlement
11l. See Jason Pardo, Comment, Excluding Immigrants on the Basis of Health: The Haitian Centers
Council Decision Criticized, 11 J. CoNTEjp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 523, 538 (1995).
112. 125 CONG. REC. 37,230 (1979) (statement of Rep. Vento); see also id. at 37,234 (statement of
Rep. Bruce Vento). Representative Holtzman added:
This bill sets up careful and explicit requirements regarding medical screening. There was a
question on the floor about exotic and tropical diseases that refugees might have. We have no
system now for following up with refugees who come here with medical problems. This bill
will set up such a system.
Id. at 37,236.
113. See 126 CONG. REC. 4504 (1980) (statement of Rep. Danielson) ("Recent HEW figures,..
indicate that, nationwide, 37.02 percent of the refugees (more than 112,540) were receiving medicaid
[sic] ...."); 125 CONG. REC. 23,251 (1979) (statement of Sen. Chiles) ("A disproportionate number of the
refugees were elderly and disabled, who were pushed out of Cuba .... They need a tremendous amount
of medical and social services, and that is what we have agreed to provide in the appropriations
compromise .... ); id. at 35,819 (statement of Rep. Lungren) ("[A] good portion of those refugees who
have already been here for 4 years are still on some form of assistance-cash assistance or medical
assistance of some sort."); id. at 23,248 (statement of Sen. Cranston) ("The California Department of Social
Services does know that 43,000 Indochina refugees presently receive cash assistance .... This implies that
the refugees are not becoming economical [sic] self-sufficient as originally expected.").
114. 125 CONG. REC. 35,819 (1979).
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was not to exclude but to provide for a coordinated program that took into
account the differing needs of individual refugees."5  Representative
Boschwitz explained, "This legislation provides that organization and planning
we so desperately need. It allows us to take into consideration the particular
needs of the refugees as well as our own resources."" 6
While Congress made the public health exclusions applicable to refugees
at the discretion of the Attorney General, Congress also made it abundantly
clear that refugees would not be excluded because they could not pay for
medical care. Congress understood that the new refugee admission policy
would be expensive when it considered the 1980 Refugee Act. Instead of
creating divisions between refugees based on their ability to support
themselves, Congress limited the overall number of refugee admissions"7
and funded medical assistance programs." ' Absent any indication by
Congress that it intends to change its approach to refugee medical costs, the
INS HIV Rule contradicts congressional intent.
C. The Attorney General's Discretion to Grant Maivers of Ercludability to
Refugees and Asylees
In response to the analysis of the legislative history and plain language of
the Refugee Act, the INS could argue that the waiver decision is distinct from
the admission decision and that the waiver authority of the Attorney General
is greater than the authority to deny admission to nonexcludable refugees.
115. One Representative stated:
We in the Congress will have to deal with the socioeconomic impacts of this bill We sall lhac
to deal with overloaded school systems and medical clinics, scarce housing facilitics, and nsing
welfare expenditures in our local communities, Consequently. I bclice the Congress should
have a major role in determining how many people %ill enter this countrN under the provisions
of this bill.
Id. at 37.204-05 (statement of Rep. Moorehead); see also 126 CONG REc 4504 (1980) (statement of Rep
Danielson) ("Our Nation's commitment to resettle these refugees includes pro% iding financial and medical
assistance .... ); 125 CONG. REc. 23,234 (1979) (statement of Sen Kenned ) t"lTlhere will be residual
needs among some refugees beyond 2 years. but the committee belieses these needs can be met through
the other programs authorized in the bill-such as social sersice programs-hen the 2.>car limit on
Federal support of cash and medical payments end."); id. at 23.248 (statement of Sen Cranston) ('"e task
ahead of us is indeed large and it will be an expensive undertaking There is no uay to mask thait fact "'
116. 125 CONG. REC. 23,240 (1979); see also id. at 35.815 (statement of Rep Holtzman) ("Thc reason
the committee adopted a more generous-and a more realistic-reimbursement formula is that decisions
to admit refugees are within the exclusive province of the Federal Goermment and cs cr) effort must be
made to minimize the financial impact on State and local gosemiments ')
117. See The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearing oi S. 643 Before the Seitte Conui an the Judiurtrs. 96th
Cong. 22 (1979) [hereinafter Senate Heanngs]. Howes cr. Congress did not Itmut annual as) lum admi Nsions
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-781. at 20 (1980) (It is the intent of the conferees
that prior to fiscal year 1983, Congress will review the 50.000 annual numerical limitation and take
appropriate action to retain or adjust this figure."); 126 CONG Rtr 4506 t1980) (statement of Rep Butler)
("[T]he importance of this legislation is for the Congress of the United States to retain control of the
number of refugees .... ).
118. See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(e).
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Given that medical costs are a public charge consideration," 9 however, the
INS must argue that it has more discretion to deny admission to excludable
refugees under the Refugee Act than to nonexcludable ones. The INS may
instead try to argue that Congress granted the Attorney General complete
discretion to grant waivers of immigration exclusions even though it limited
the Attorney General's discretion in the normal admission process. This
argument, however, ignores how actual refugee admission decisions are made
for refugees who must apply for a waiver.
The decision to grant refugee or asylee status is within the discretion of
the Attorney General. 20 Under refugee and asylum application procedures,
the presiding officer or immigration judge first determines whether an applicant
is eligible for refugee status.' 2' An applicant is eligible if, inter alia, she
meets the refugee definition, 22 is not firmly resettled in another country,2 3
did not engage in persecution, 24 and has not committed an aggravated
felony."2 If she is eligible for admission, but is excludable under the
applicable immigration exclusions, the presiding officer or immigration judge
must then decide whether the applicant merits a favorable exercise of
discretion in the form of an exclusion waiver, which then entitles the refugee
to admission. An officer or immigration judge must base a decision to admit
or deny the refugee or asylum applicant as a matter of discretion on the
"totality of the circumstances."'' 26 The most important factor is the harsh
consequences that may result from denying an applicant resettlement because
of the reasons for which she fled her country of origin in the first place.127
The waiver decision is one part of the decision to exercise discretion to
admit a refugee. An applicant's excludability under one of the waivable
exclusions is a negative discretionary factor that must be considered under the
totality of the circumstances test articulated in the Board of Immigration
Appeals' decision in Matter of Pula. 28 Other factors that the Attorney
General must weigh in the admission decision measure the strength of the
refugee's claim to be a refugee of "special humanitarian concern.' 29 The
waiver decision is not distinct from the decision to exercise discretion
favorably to admit an applicant. 30 While the presiding officer or immigration
119. See supra Part 1.
120. See Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 471 (B.I.A. 1987).
121. See id. at 474.
122. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42).
123. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.1(b) (1995).
124. See 8 U.S.C. § I I01(a)(42).
125. See id. § 1157(c)(3).
126. Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 473 (B.I.A. 1987).
127. See id. at 474 ( [T]he danger of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most egregious
of adverse factors.").
128. See id. at 473-74.
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3).
130. Under the asylum procedures, an applicant for asylum does not submit a request for a waiver
separate from her request for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1995). In contrast, if a refugee is excludable,
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judge must decide whether to waive an exclusion before deciding to admit an
applicant, there is no reason, in the statutes or otherwise, why the Attorney
General should be granted more discretion for this one step of decisionmaking.
According to the Refugee Act, the Attorney General cannot exclude a
refugee applicant who is not otherwise excludable on the basis that the
applicant is likely to become a public charge. 31 The language of the Refugee
Act does not provide the Attorney General with unlimited discretion; she
cannot apply public charge questions to deny or grant a refugee visa.
While the lesser level of protection afforded HIV-positive refugees may
not seem a significant distinction on its face, the implications are enormous.
If the INS can deny a refugee waiver based on public charge concerns, it can
also deny a waiver based on the labor certification requirements and immigrant
documentation requirements. All three of these exclusions'32 are mandatorily
waived for refugee applicants in the Refugee Act.'" Extended to its logical
conclusion, the INS's claimed waiver authority could have dramatic
repercussions. Take, for instance, the rather common case of a refugee who
suffers from a mental disorder due to torture. This disorder, which causes the
refugee to be a threat to herself, would justify a public health exclusion.'"
Under the logic adopted by the INS, it could exclude her for nothing more
than an inability to provide documentation of her identity.' Or take the
example of a refugee who was a member of the Communist Party in
Afghanistan and who is excludable as a former member of a Communist
Party. 36 If a seventy-year-old refugee with a physical disability that affects
her ability to earn a living was a member of the Communist Party, the INS
could deny a waiver of the exclusion on the basis that the refugee is likely to
become a public charge, even if the INS concludes that her membership in the
Communist Party is not a reason to exclude her.'
37
Congress surely could not have intended this result when it granted the
Attorney General the discretion to waive exclusion provisions under the
Refugee Act. One primary purpose of passing the Refugee Act was to limit the
discretion of the Attorney General. 3' By considering public charge issues in
she must submit a waiver request to the officer in charge of deciding %%hether to grant a refugee vt,,w See
id. § 207.3. However, it is the Attorney General who promulgated these procedure, not Congress Thus.
even if one concludes that the refugee waiver process is one distinct step in the decision to grant or den)
a visa, it is one subset of the entire discretionary decision, not a separate decision process altogether
131. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3).
132. See id. § 1182(a)(4) (public charge exclusion); id § 1182 (a)(5) (labor ccruttication exclusion).
id. § l182(a)(7)(A) (immigrant documentation exclusion).
133. See id. § 1157(c)(3).
134. See id. § 11 82(a)(I)(A)(it)(l).
135. See id. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i).
136. See id. § I182(a)(3)(D)(i).
137. See id. § 1182(a)(4).
138. See Anker & Posner, supra note 95. at 48-50. 52-56
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the refugee waiver process, the INS is considering factors that Congress could
not have intended to make relevant to refugee resettlement decisions.
D. The 1993 Codification of the HIV Exclusion Did Not Expand the Attorney
General's Authority to Deny HIV Waivers to Refugees
To salvage the INS HIV Rule as a legitimate exercise of administrative
discretion, Congress's 1993 codification of the HIV public health exclusion
would have to demonstrate express congressional intent to make the public
charge exclusion applicable to HIV waiver applicants or to afford the Attorney
General discretion to apply the public charge exclusion to HIV-positive
refugees. The legislative history of the 1993 codification of the HIV exclusion
reveals that Congress sidestepped the debate over how the HIV exclusion
should apply to refugees. Absent an express intention to change the HIV
waiver process under the Refugee Act, neither courts nor the INS should infer
from the legislative history of the 1993 codification an implicit intention to
alter the Refugee Act as a general immigration exclusion.
Some contend that, with the codification of the HIV exclusion in 1993,
Congress explicitly intended to allow cost considerations to play a role in the
admission of HIV-positive refugees.' 39 It is uncontestable that the major
impetus for the codification was President Clinton's proposal to remove HIV-
positive status from the list of communicable diseases listed under the public
health exclusions 40 at a time when parole was pending for 222 HIV-positive
asylum seekers detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 4' It seems
counterintuitive, given this fact, to conclude that Congress did not intend to
exclude all HIV-positive aliens, including HIV-positive refugees.
Only the actual test applied by courts to determine when a piece of
legislation overrides an earlier statute can resolve the legitimacy of the INS
HIV Rule. In the absence of explicit overruling by subsequent legislation,
repeal by implication is only inferred by courts when two statutes are
irreconcilable. 42 Courts have found that intent to overrule a statute should
not be construed from statements made by members of Congress after the
139. See Pardo, supra note 111, at 535.
140. See Bartz, supra note 21, at 160; supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
141. See Jason W. Konvicka, Note, Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor Your Huddled Masses... Except
When They Have HIV: An Analysis of Current United States Immigration Policy Regarding HIV-Positive
Aliens in Light of Guantanamo Bay, 27 U. RicH. L. REv. 531, 542 (1993); McCormick, supra note 4:
Pendleton, supra note 79, at 299.
142. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1985)
(noting that repeal of antitrust laws by implication disfavored); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 190 (1977) (noting that repeal by implication not permissible unless two statutes are irreconcilable);
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (explaining that repeal by implication should
only be upheld where two statutes cannot mutually coexist); Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 294
(1953) (holding partial overlap of statutes on same subject matter does not justify repeal by implication).
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enactment of the statute. 4 3 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has ruled that statements
made during congressional floor debates unconnected with the passage of a
statute should not be construed as express intent to overrule an earlier statute
absent explicit statutory language in the subsequent law." Unless Congress
expressly indicated in the text of the 1993 HIV exclusion that it intended to
codify the administrative INS HIV Rule or intended to apply public charge
concerns to HIV-positive refugees, statements by members of Congress in floor
debates cannot support an implicit overruling of the Refugee Act's prohibition
on applying the public charge exclusion to refugees. Given this legal standard,
whether members of Congress expressed their disdain for HIV-positive
refugees is irrelevant to the question of whether the Refugee Act waiver is still
legitimate law. Under the D.C. Circuit's analysis, only an explicit statement in
text of the HIV exclusion passed in 1993 could change the application of the
exclusion to refugees through the Refugee Act.
In 1993, President Clinton expressed an intent to remove HIV from the list
of "dangerous contagious diseases" listed in the public health exclusions.' 5
Following this announcement, a group of senators lead by Senator Nickles
introduced Amendment 37 to Senate Bill 1, the National Institute of Health
Revitalization Act of 1993.146 Amendment 37 codified the designation of
HIV infection as a communicable disease of public health significance under
the public health immigration exclusions. The text of the new HIV exclusion
does not even mention the Refugee Act or the Attorney General's waiver
authority. 4 7 The legislative history of the 1993 HIV exclusion highlights the
paucity of support for the notion that it amends the Refugee Act.
Refugees were mentioned only seven times in the Senate debate and nine
times in the House debates in over forty pages of congressional discussion of
143. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video. Inc.. 115 S Ct 464. 471 n 6 0 9A i i noting sicsss
of Congress on meaning of statute passed by earlier Congress not accorded %%eight in statutory
construction); Weinberger v. Rossi. 456 U.S. 25. 35 (1982) (noting post hoc statements b) congressional
committees are not given significant weight in statutory construction); United States ' Clark. 445 U S 23.
33 n.9 (1980) (holding congressional remarks on statute passed by another Congress hast little seight in
statutory construction); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. United States EPA . 886 F2d 355. 365
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that postenactment statements by members of Congress cannot be considered in
determining meaning of statute); Tinch v. Walters. 765 F.2d 599. 602 (6th Cir 1985) tholding siewss ot
Congress should be given little weight in statutory construction of statute passed b) prestous Congrcs-,).
Quarles v. St. Clair. 711 F.2d 691, 705 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting esen explicit postcnactmcnn. retro.spectisc
statements of legislative intent should not be controlling).
144. See Colorado v. United States Dep't of Interior. 880 F2d 481. 490 (D C Cir 1989)
145. See Hilts. supra note 6, at A17.
146. See 139 CONG. REc. S1707-08 (daily ed. Feb 17. 1993) Amendment 37 (proposed b, Sens
Nickles, Dole, Kassebaum. Helms, Gramm. Lott, Coats. Mack. Craig. Bond. and Coserdell) rcquired a
report of the estimated medical costs to the United States of admitting persons %ith HIV This report %%as
to include a breakdown of the costs to States and municipalities and an assessment of ho%% s&ell the public
charge provision was working as an exclusion. It also required a separate report on the cost implications
of refugees entering, or likely to enter, the United States with HIV. and a comparison of the costs of alicns
with other health afflictions with the costs of HIV-positive aliens admitted to the United State. See id at
S1708.
147. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(3) (1994).
The Yale Law Journal
the HIV exclusion.' 8 The small number of congressional representatives who
even mentioned refugees illuminates the lack of intent to affect how the HIV
exclusion, as a general immigration law, was supposed to apply to refugees.
Senator Kennedy first raised the issue of how the HIV exclusion could affect
refugee applicants directly when he said:
But what the supporters of the Nickles amendment are saying ... is
you have 268 black Haitians in Guantanamo Bay .... Many of them
have been found to be in credible fear of persecution or death if they
go back in Haiti. The proponents of this amendment say, "Send them
back. Send them back. We do not care."'
149
In response, Senator Donald Nickles said, "[R]efugees, when they come
in and seek asylum in the United States, are automatically eligible for welfare
packages including Medicaid. I did not realize that until recently. I am just
saying I am concerned about the cost. That is 215 people.' 50 He went on to
argue that all refugees are eligible for Medicaid, so the costs would be
enormous if all refugees were admitted.' 5' Senator Jesse Helms opposed
admitting Haitian refugee applicants held at Guantanamo Bay because he did
not think they were refugees. He argued that "they are not applying for
immigration through normal channels. This administration obviously considers
Haitians to be political refugees."' 52
Despite these negative comments about HIV-positive refugees, not one
senator proposed changing the admission or waiver process for refugees. In
fact, some of the Senate discussion of refugees as a distinct group focused on
the availability of an exclusion waiver. Senator Alan Simpson argued that the
exclusion "does not affect refugees who are admitted under another provision
which allows waivers of medical exclusion." 53 Senators Nancy Kassebaum
and Kennedy both commented that the HIV exclusion is waivable under
current administrative practice, and that administrative practice would not be
affected by the Amendment.'54 Thus, no discussion in the Senate reveals an
148. See 139 CONG. REC. H2729-33, H2736, H2738-39 (daily ed. May 25, 1993); 139 CONG. REC.
H1203-10 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993); 139 CONG. REC.S1761-67 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1993); 139 CONG. REC.
S1707-29 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1993).
149. 139 CONG. REc. S1712 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1993).
150. Id. at S1719.
151. See 139 CONG. REC. S1762 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1993).
152. 139 CONG. REc. S 1722 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1993) (statement of Senator Helms). Senator Helms
also argued:
[Uinder the law anyone granted refugee status is automatically given welfare.... [I]f we allow
the 300 or so AIDS-infected refugees at Guantanamo entry we are looking at a potential cost
to the taxpayers of $20 million in medical bills alone, and that is just the tip of the iceberg.
Id.
153. Id. at S 1729.
154. See 139 CONG. REc. 56883 (daily ed. May 28, 1993).
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explicit intention to change the admission process or administrative practice
governing refugee HIV waivers.
In the House of Representatives, Representative Henry Waxman expressed
dismay that refugees with HIV would be subject to a different standard than
refugees without HIV.'55 Representative Waxman asked, "'Should we turn
them back to certain execution and persecution, or should we accept them on
the basis which the United States has accepted refugees in the past'?"'"
Representative Robert Dornan argued that a holding area such as Guantanamo
Bay offered a solution to the problem. In defending the differential treatment
of refugees with HIV, Representative Dornan said, "I want to be humane, but
I am not going to let in communicable diseased people into this country,
because it will kill as sure as you and I stand here. And we want our
constituents to respect us."' 57 Representative John Cunningham skirted the
issue by arguing that "law based on individual specifics is bad law. It is going
to cost us down the line for these AIDS patients beyond what we are already
saturated with."'58 Like the Senate discussion, the House discussion lacked
any proposals to change the refugee admission process or the availability of
HIV waivers for refugees.
Despite the negative comments of a few representatives, there is no
evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended to change the
availability of HIV waivers under the Refugee Act or to codify the existing
INS practice of applying the INS HIV Rule. Commenting on the conference
committee report, Representative Romano Mazzoli stated:
Regulations, policies, and practices have developed with regard to
waivers of exclusion, testing requirements, and health-related
questioning. The conferees, by requiring that HIV be included among
the list of excludable diseases until such time as Congress shall
remove it, have taken the position that waiver, questioning, and
testing decisions should continue to be left to the discretion of the
Attorney General. Thus, the conference report does not codify any
current policies or practices concerning those authorities.'Y
In addition, at least three senators relied on the availability of a waiver for
refugees when they voted for the exclusion."
Neither the 1993 HIV exclusion itself nor the legislative history of the
exclusion in congressional floor debates supports the conclusion that Congress
155. See 139 CONG. REC. H1204 (daily ed. Mar. II. 1993).
156. Id. at H1208.
157. Id. at H 1209.
158. Id.
159. 139 CONG. REc. H2739 (daily ed. May 25. 1993) (emphasis added) Rcprcscntatiac Thomas
Bliley noted that "[w]aiver authority under the current law remains unchanged " Id at H2736
160. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54 (noting comments of Senators Kasscbaum, Kcnncd).
and Simpson).
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expressly intended to change the previous law or to codify administrative
practices regarding refugee exclusion waivers. The legislative enactment of the
HIV exclusion, without an express overruling of the 1980 Refugee Act, will
not support the argument that the INS is acting within the bounds of its
discretion in interpreting its authority to apply the public charge exclusion.
In sum, the INS HIV Rule is a public charge exclusion because it is used
to exclude aliens based on the cost of admitting them. The application of this
administrative regulation to refugees violates the plain language of the Refugee
Act and its legislative purpose of eliminating public charge issues from the
refugee admission process. The codification of the HIV exclusion as a general
immigration law does not in and of itself indicate an express intention on the
part of Congress to change how the general public health exclusions are
applied to refugees, nor does the legislative history of the HIV exclusion
establish any express congressional intent to change the policy under the
Refugee Act of exempting refugees from the public charge exclusion. It
therefore does not make the INS HIV Rule a legally valid exercise of
administrative discretion.
III. CHALLENGING THE INS HIV RULE: DISCRETION GONE AWRY
While the INS has clearly overstepped its authority by implementing the
INS HIV Rule, challenging the imposition of the rule is difficult because of the
discretionary nature of refugee, asylum, and adjustment of status decisions.16"'
The optimal solution would be for Congress to clarify the refugee waiver
provision in subsequent legislative amendments. Independent of this action, the
INS should voluntarily rescind this regulation as an unwarranted contravention
of the Refugee Act. Yet it seems unlikely that either of these actions will be
taken in the near future. Consequently, those affected by the rule are left with
the option of seeking judicial review of a waiver denial in the federal courts.
A. Challenging the INS HIV Rule in Court: Limited Judicial Review
Several factors limit judicial review of the INS HIV Rule.162 Refugees
abroad who apply for an HIV waiver are not entitled to judicial review of
waiver denials.'63 In addition, nonresident aliens located outside the United
161. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 165-71 (2d ed. 1991)
(discussing discretionary nature of asylum).
162. It may be possible to claim that the INS guidelines are a regulation within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act and therefore may be challenged on the basis that the INS did not follow the
appropriate notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Bartz, supra note
21, at 169-70; Bean & Hilliard, supra note 14, at 495. For alternative views on judicial review of waiver
denials, see Kerry A. Krzynowek, Note, Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale: Rejecting the Indefinite
Detention of HIV-Infected Aliens, II J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 541 (1995).
163. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.3 (1995). The UNHCR has indicated that
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States do not have standing to sue in U.S. courts for visa denials.' " Thus
refugees are effectively precluded from challenging waiver denials in U.S.
courts. The only groups that can challenge the INS HIV Rule are refugees and
asylees attempting to adjust to permanent resident status.
Unfortunately, the precarious status of refugees and asylees in the United
States deters them from challenging the exclusion policy. The statutes and
federal regulations are not clear on whether asylum status can be revoked if
a refugee or asylee is found excludable during an adjustment interview. The
federal regulations state that if the District Director denies an application for
adjustment of status by a refugee or asylee, '[n]o appeal shall lie from the
denial . . . but such denial will be without prejudice to the alien's right to
renew the application" in deportation or exclusion proceedings.bS This
suggests that the INS believes that they may deport refugees and asylees if
they are excludable. Contrary to the presumption under this regulation, the INA
does not say that excludable refugees or asylees may be deported if the INS
denies them permanent residence.' 66 In addition, the refugee regulations
allow termination of refugee status only if an alien was "not a refugee ... at
the time of admission."' 167 The asylum regulation allows revocation of asylum
only if the alien no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution because of
changed country conditions, the alien committed fraud and was not entitled to
asylum in the first place, the alien is a danger to the security of the United
States, or the alien was convicted of an aggravated felony or a crime that
presents a danger to the community. 6 Since Congress has not suggested an
intention to repatriate recognized refugees, courts should not construe the INS
regulations to allow repatriation simply because a refugee is H1V-positive.'6
Even if the ambiguity in the INS regulations does not deter a refugee or
asylee, an adjustment applicant will only receive limited judicial review of a
waiver denial. The decision to grant asylum status is subject to the
The INS field officer with jurisdiction over the case . reviews the HIV sqaiser application
and makes a recommendation. This recommendation is certified to the INS Administrati.e
Appeals Unit (AAU) in Washington, D.C. The AAU makes the final decision, either agreeing
or disagreeing with the field officer .... There is no appeal from the AAU's decision
UNHCR Memo, supra note 14, at 2; see also Cimm. supra note 61. at 370
164. See Chinese Am. Civic Council v. Attorney Gen.. 566 F2d 321. 324 (D C Cir 1977) 0holding
that aliens denied refugee status under former INA § 203(a)(7) lacked standing because they had not
entered United States). It is unclear whether the INS applies the HIV exclusion to asylum applicants If the
INS does not apply the HIV Rule to asylum applicants, then the) do not have a "case or controscr,," upon
which to base a challenge to the HIV waiver policy of the INS See County of Los Angeles s Da. is. 440
U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (explaining two-part test to determine mootess)
165. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(0 (1995).
166. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 209. 8 U S C § 1159 (1994)
167. 8 C.F.R. § 207.8; see also Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray. 19 1 & N Dec 407 (B I A 1986)
(affirming immigration judges' refusal to adjudicate excludability of asylee)
168. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a).
169. See ANKER, supra note 161. at 67 n.339 (noting that asylum may not be resoked unless initial
grant was unwarranted or country conditions have changed).
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discretionary authority of the Attorney General.170 Thus a court will only
review a decision to deny adjustment of status to decide if the denial was
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.17 1 However limited the
judicial review given to administrative rules and regulations is, the preceding
parts of this Note suggest that a litigant has a strong cause of action for
invalidating the HIV Rule under the first prong of the Chevron test. In
instituting the HIV Rule, the INS has illegally considered factors "Congress
could not have intended to make relevant."'
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B. Policy Reasons for the INS to Voluntarily Rescind the HIV Rule
The INS should rescind the application of the INS HIV Rule voluntarily
as an unwise policy for two reasons. First, the rule undermines international
refugee protection for HIV-positive refugees and for the most economically
vulnerable refugees. Second, the exclusion lacks empirical foundation as a
measure to contain health care costs.
1. Undermining International Refugee Protection
Congress passed the Refugee Act to encourage other nations to accept
refugees regardless of physical condition, gender, age, or race.17 By
170. While there have not been any reported decisions denying adjustment of status to refugees or
asylees as a matter of discretion, the courts have indicated that adjustment of status for other applicants is
discretionary. See, e.g., Fulgencio v. INS, 573 F.2d 596, 597 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that only abuse of
discretion justifies overturning decision to deny adjustment); Eun-Hee Lee v. United States, 651 F. Supp.
1264, 1267 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting that adjustment of status is matter of discretion). Although a refugee
whose status is terminated is still eligible for withholding of deportation, the burden of proof for this
remedy is higher than the burden of proof for asylum status. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421.
444-45 (1987). Thus, if an asylee or refugee has her status revoked, there would be a direct challenge to
the international obligation of nonrefoulement. See generally Andrew G. Pizor, Comment, Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council: The Return of Haitian Refugees, 17 FORDHANI INT'L L.J. 1062 (1994) (discussing right
to nonrefoulement after Sale v. Haitian Centers Council decision).
171. Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-14
(1984) (noting in context of Environmental Protection Agency that regulations of congressionally created
agency are controlling unless arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute). For a discussion of
discretion in asylum and refugee law, see ANKER, supra note 161; Arthur C. Helton, The Proper Role of
Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999 (1985); Michael G. Heyman,
Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigration Decisionmaking, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861 (1994).
172. United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950); see also
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a
single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy.") (citing United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1849)); Burnet v. Chicago
Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (stating phrase must be interpreted in light of purpose of statute); White
v. INS, 75 F.3d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating administrative agency interpretations are only entitled to
deference when congressional intent is unclear); St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1465 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding agency rule is arbitrary when agency relies on factors Congress had not intended to
consider); Usery v. Kennecott Copper, 577 F.2d 1113, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1977) (noting administrative
regulation should not be followed when it conflicts with design of statute or exceeds administrative
authority).
173. See Senate Hearings, supra note 117. at 37 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("[lit is important, as
we are trying to gain support with other countries for refugees, for us to have this legislation."); 126 CONG.
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considering resettlement costs, the INS regulations encourage other nations to
make distinctions among individual refugees based on their earning capacity.
The INS HIV Rule thus undermines congressional intent by indicating to other
nations that they will be justified in resettling refugees on the basis of their
health, education, or any other supposed indicators of earning capacity.
Use of the INS HIV Rule in the refugee exclusion waiver process also
signals that the United States believes that all HIV-positive refugees are
presumptively a burden on the health care system and thereby encourages
discrimination against HIV-positive people.' The ultimate result may be
that other nations will feel free to refuse resettlement to refugees on any
grounds, including reasoning based upon empirically unfounded presumptions
similar to those contained in the U.S. policy. 7
As the preceding Part demonstrates, if the Attorney General may consider
public charge concerns in the waiver process, then the Attorney General may
also consider other factors Congress explicitly made inapplicable to refugees.
This breakdown ultimately sends a signal to other countries that once refugees
may be excluded for one reason, they can be excluded for any reason at all,
without regard to the humanitarian implications of the decision to exclude. The
ultimate result of applying the INS HIV Rule to HIV-positive refugee
applicants is to encourage other nations to deny resettlement to HIV-positive
refugees or refugees with other "undesirable" characteristics. Such a result is
clearly contrary to the original purpose of the Refugee Act: to encourage other
nations to admit refugees on a humanitarian basis.
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There is a final problem with applying the INS HIV Rule to refugees. The
rule eviscerates the distinction between refugee and immigration policies. U.S.
refugee policy has been based on humanitarian considerations ever since the
enactment of the Refugee Act. U.S. immigration policy, on the other hand, has
always been concerned with screening out undesirables and promoting the
economic interests of the United States. By applying cost considerations to
each individual refugee, the INS signals its willingness to treat refugees as
immigrants.
Congressional failure to fight this breakdown foreshadows more measures
to curtail refugee and asylum protections." Unless Congress and the INS
recognize that cost considerations are only relevant to the overall number of
REC. 4502 (1980) (statement of Rep. Fish) ("It is clearly in our self-interest to continue efforts to encourage
participation of other countries in refugee resettlement efforts.").
174. See Mary C. Dunlap. AIDS and Discriminanon in the United States: Reflections on the Nature
of Prejudice in a Virus, 34 ViLL. L. REv. 909, 912-17 (1989); Lynn Acker Starr. Note, The Ineffectiveness
and Impact of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Exclusion in US. Immigration Las. 3 GEO
IMMIGR. LJ. 87, 106 (1989).
175. See supra Section I.D.
176. See supra text accompanying note 173.
177. See Congress' Proposed Immigration Bill: Severe Ne% Restrictions for A) lum Seekers. AsYLL %I
PROGRAM (Lawyer's Comm. for Human Rights), Oct. 10. 1995. at I.
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refugees we admit, Congress will freely pass legislation that promotes unequal
treatment of refugee groups and therefore undermines the basis for
international refugee protection.
2. Health Care Costs for HIV-Positive Refugees Will Not Harm the
Health Care System
One plausible argument why the INS HIV Rule is a public health
exclusion is that treating refugees who develop AIDS may create a crisis in the
health care industry. There is no doubt that a major concern behind the
enactment of the HIV exclusion in 1993 was the rising cost of medical
care. 78 Requiring refugees to prove that they will not need government
funding is a measure to ensure that they do not drain health care resources. It
is true that the cost of HIV treatment is tremendous. 79 One researcher has
estimated that the annual cost of treating AIDS and HIV was between $10.3
billion and $15.2 billion in 1995, based on an average cost of $102,000 per
patient. "'
While protecting health care resources is a legitimate public health
rationale, the INS HIV Rule does not necessarily reduce health care
expenditures; it only ensures that government funds will not be used. This, of
course, places the INS HIV Rule squarely in the province of public charge
considerations. The concern is not with the overall amount of health care
resources used, but rather, with the burden on government Medicaid spending.
HIV-positive refugees do not pose a significant threat to the health care system
because the number of HIV-positive refugees likely to be admitted is not very
large.' 8' The cost of detaining HIV-positive refugees at Guantanamo Bay
was estimated to be between five hundred thousand and one million dollars a
month.'82 It is estimated that detention for two years cost the United States
between twelve and fifty-five million dollars.'83 In addition, the cost of
178. See Juan P. Osuna, The Exclusion from the United States of Aliens Infected with the AIDS Virus:
Recent Developments and Prospects for the Future, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 29-30 (1993).
179. See Green & Amo, supra note 33, at 1261 ("Lifetime medical care costs of individuals with
acquired immuno deficiency syndrome (AIDS) average $40,000 to $75,000.").
180. See Fred J. Hellinger, Forecasts of the Costs of Medical Care for Persons with HIV: 1992-1995,
29 INQUIRY 356, 356 (1992). Hellinger has modified this estimate downward by $30,000 per patient, and
predicts that costs will continue to decline. Even so, the cost for treating HIV over the course of a lifetime
can reach $72,000. See Fred J. Hellinger, The Lifetime Cost of Treating a Person With HIV, 270 JAMA
475, 477 (1993).
181. See Memorandum from the U.S. Department of State to Charles McCance, Director, Division of
Quarantine, Center for Prevention Services, Centers for Disease Control 8 (Aug. 3, 1987) (on file with the
Yale Law Journal) ("IT]hose designated 'of special humanitarian concern' to the United States by the
President ... exhibit a very low incidence of the AIDS virus.").
182. See Andrew A. Skolnick, Doctors Help HIV-Positive Haitian Refugees Gain Freedom from US
Government Detention Camp, 270 JAMA 563, 564 (1993).
183. I arrived at this figure by using the base cost of $500.000 a month for two years. See id.; see also
Creola Johnson, Quarantining HIV-Infected Haitians: United States' Violations of International Law at
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testing all refugees for HIV, a cost born by the United States, far exceeds the
medical savings gained through exclusion."
Finally, the INS HIV Rule apparently assumes that HIV-positive refugees
would be unable to work to support themselves. The assumption that all
persons with HIV are incapable of working recalls the assumptions made about
immigrants in the early 1900s."' The INS has not provided evidence that
refugees with HIV are less likely to be self-sufficient than other refugees. It
the INS is truly concerned about the burden that aliens place on the health care
system, it could apply the public charge exclusion to other disorders that are
just as expensive as HIV.'8 6  Distinguishing HIV-positive refugees is
arbitrary; other refugees are also eligible for Medicaid, special refugee medical
funds, and state benefits." 7 The cost of providing Medicaid to a sick refugee
may meet or exceed the cost of treating HIV.' Furthermore, special
programs were set up under the Refugee Act to assist refugees requiring
Guantanamo Bay, 37 How. L.J. 305, 327 (1994) (noting that Professor Harold Koh estimatcd annual cost
at S55 million).
184. See Douglas Scott Johnson, Note, 77ie United States' Denial of [he Inmnigration of People itth
AIDS, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 145, 149-50 (1992)
185. See, e.g., Tambara '. Weedin, 299 F. 299 (9th Cir 1924) (excluding alien as likclt to bct.oiiic
public charge because he appeared to be deaf); Ex purte Hosaye Sakaguchi. 277 F 913, 916 19th Cir
1922). The Sakaguchi court noted that:
If there were in this case any evidence whatever of mental or phsical disabili> or an', ta.t
tending to show that the burden of supporting the appellant is likelN to be cast upon the publi..
we should have no hesitation in saying that the conclusion of the board of special tnquir) ,,ould
be unassailable in a court.
Id. at 916; see also Margulies, supra note 44. at 539 Yet. because of the long incubation period ot 111V
most HtV-positive people are asymptomatic for five to etght years See Sarah N Qureshi. Global Olrattini
of HIV-Positive Aliens: International Restrictions Barring HIV-Posirtve Aliens. 19 MI) J l ,'t t &
TRADE 81, 84 (1995); Fernandez, supra note 13. at 84-85 The assumption that people ,,ith IIIV are
incapable of self-support only reinforces ostracism and discrimination against people %% ith IlHV See Dunlap,
supra note 174, at 912-17 (1989).
186. A Canadian report found that treatment of immigrants % ,tlh heart disease enigrating to Canada
would cost S23.2 million over ten years, while treating immigrants sith AIDS uould cot SIN 5 nillion
See Cimini, supra note 61, at 384. The cost of treating nonlymphoc)tic leuketitia o~er a tisc-car pcriod
is estimated at S 193.000 for transplantation and S 136.000 for chemotherap See H Gilberl VcIlh & ELri
B. Larson, Cost Effectiveness of Bone Marrow Transplantation tn Acute Nonlssnphio Ixt l.uketinu 321
NEW ENG. J. MED. 807, 807 (1989). The cost of liver transplantation in 1984 sa5 estimated at S250.tJ
per life year, and the cost has risen since that time. See 86 J NA'L CACER lST 415 i 1994A, %e illso
David V. Schapira et al., Intensive Care. Survival, and E-tpense of Treating Crttcalh Ill Cant cr Paients,
269 JAMA 783, 783 (1993) (finding that cost per year of life gained skas S82.845 for patents sith oild
tumors and S189,339 for patients with hematologic cancers). Thomas J Smith ct al . Effitta i and Cost
Effectiveness of Cancer Treatment: Rational Allocation of Resources Based on Dec liton Anal/%is S5 J
NAT'L CANCER INST. 1460, 1460 (1993) (summarizing other studies on cost of cancer treatmtent),
Konvicka, supra note 141, at 545-46 (arguing that overall cost of treating heart disease tor itmigrant, t,
higher than cost of treating HIV). In comparison, the annual costs for ari'hntis care ate abo c 150 billion
and the annual expenditures on cancer care in 1990 were S35 billion See Costs for Arthriti, Cure lt $/ i
Billion and Keep Rising, AM. MED. NEWS. Dec. I1. 1995. at 16. Smith. siipra. at 1460
187. See Overview of Aliens' Eligibility for Federal Programs. 14 IMMIGR L RIP 10, 1V) I1,)C)5)
188. The mean Medicare payment in the last year of life for all recipients uas S13.316 in 1988 See
Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel. The Economics of Dying. 330 NEA E",G J MID 540, 540
(1994). In contrast, the mean Medicaid payments to AIDS patients oser the entire course of the illnes, in
1986 was S 11,972. See Roxanne Andrews ci al.. Longitudinal Patterns of California Meledi aid Re tiptent
with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 13 HEALTh CARE FINANCING REV I. 7 (1991
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medical attention.' 89 Preserving health care resources is not a reason to deny
HIV-positive refugees access to these programs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current INS policy regarding HIV waivers not only reflects a profound
misunderstanding of the 1980 Refugee Act, but also reveals a lack of
accountability in the administration of immigration law. The INS has
overstepped its authority by considering public charge concerns in the HIV
exclusion waiver process for refugees, and refugees and asylees applying for
permanent resident status. The INS HIV Rule is a unique administrative
regulation; for the first time ever, the INS is using a public charge concern as
a criterion for waiver eligibility.
While HIV may present unique health cost concerns that justify
considering public charge issues, Congress explicitly stated in the Refugee Act
that the public charge exclusion does not apply to refugees. As an
administrative agency subject to the will of Congress, the INS has no authority
to make a unilateral decision to extend the scope of the public charge
exclusion to include HIV-positive refugees. If Congress wants to change the
admission criteria to ensure the self-sufficiency of individual refugees, it
should do so expressly through legislative action.
To impose the burden of this extraconstitutional exercise of power on
refugees and asylees, groups that are uniquely vulnerable to abuse because
their members are stateless, is both unconscionable and contrary to the basic
principle that a democratic government abides by the rule of law. It is not the
prerogative of any executive agency to contravene express congressional
mandates simply because it can do so without getting caught by the courts or
reprimanded by Congress.
189. See Bartz, supra note 21, at 157-58.
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